An Environment-Protection Hierarchical Differential Game Between Enterprise and State


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We consider an environment-protection hierarchical differential game between enterprise and state with the state acting as the leader. An algorithm for approximate solution of the game is proposed.

作者简介

E. Grigor’eva

Department of Mathematics and Computer Sciences, Texas Women’s University

Email: cmm@cs.msu.ru
美国, Denton, TX

E. Khailov

Lomonosov Moscow State University, Faculty of Computation Mathematics and Cybernetics

Email: cmm@cs.msu.ru
俄罗斯联邦, Moscow

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