An Effective Model of Countering Terrorist Danger: Successful Experience of Mauritania

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The article analyzes the approaches of the Mauritanian authorities to the fight against terrorism. While the countries of the Sahel region are suffering from a crisis caused by the actions of jihadist groups, Mauritania has become a positive exception in this regard. There have been no major terrorist attacks there in the last 10 years, although there are significant problems in the country that make it vulnerable to extremism. These are unresolved political issues, huge social and ethnic differences, and the weakness of the economy. The terrorist group Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which has been organizing terrorist attacks in the country since 2005 and recruiting young Mauritanians into the ranks of jihadists, tried to take advantage of the numerous problems of Mauritania and the popularity of political Islam there. The peak of terrorist activity in Mauritania was 2005–2011, when more than ten attacks were carried out. Since coming to power in 2009, President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz began the formation of a new anti-terrorist strategy that took into account both the Algerian experience and the Mauritanian realities. This strategy was complex in nature and included both military measures and “soft approaches”. Among the military measures, a successful military reform should be noted, affecting military education, increasing the mobility of the armed forces and the capabilities of special forces units. The approach of the Mauritanian authorities to the internal religious and political arena has also undergone a radical change. In addition to offering dialogue to hardliners and the legalization of the Islamist Tevassul party, the approach aimed at involving the nomadic population of remote desert areas in the public space of Mauritania has fully justified itself.

Sobre autores

Lusine Melkonyan

RUDN University

Email: asaf-today@mail.ru
ORCID ID: 0000-0003-0294-8076

Teaching assistant of the Department of Theory and History of International Relations

Rússia, 117198, Moscow, Miklukho-Maklaya str., 6

Natalia Zherlitsyna

Institute for African Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences

Autor responsável pela correspondência
Email: asaf-today@mail.ru
ORCID ID: 0000-0001-8647-9419

Senior Research Fellow, Institute for African Studies, RAS

Rússia, Moscow

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Declaração de direitos autorais © Russian Academy of Sciences, 2023

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