Email this article Properties of Open Procedure of Sequential Veto-Voting
- Authors: Novikova N.M.1, Pospelova I.I.2
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Affiliations:
- Dorodnicyn Computing Centre of Russian Academy of Sciences
- Department of Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics
- Issue: Vol 42, No 4 (2018)
- Pages: 177-185
- Section: Article
- URL: https://journals.rcsi.science/0278-6419/article/view/176260
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.3103/S0278641918040064
- ID: 176260
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Abstract
Game-theoretic properties of joint decision making are considered. Procedures based on sequential open voting by veto are investigated. The paper is aimed at the question how to make voters’ behavior intuitively rational when they choose their optimal strategies. The review of the existing results is also presented and the connection between them is established. Further research is discussed as well.
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About the authors
N. M. Novikova
Dorodnicyn Computing Centre of Russian Academy of Sciences
Author for correspondence.
Email: N_Novikova@umail.ru
Russian Federation, Moscow, 119333
I. I. Pospelova
Department of Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics
Email: N_Novikova@umail.ru
Russian Federation, Moscow, 119991
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