电邮这篇文章 Actual Vulnerabilities of Industrial Automation Protocols of an Open Platform Communications Series
- 作者: Zegzhda D.P.1, Kalinin M.O.1, Levykin M.V.2
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隶属关系:
- Peter the Great St.Petersburg Polytechnic University
- Federal Research Center “Computer Science and Control,” Russian Academy of Sciences
- 期: 卷 53, 编号 8 (2019)
- 页面: 972-979
- 栏目: Article
- URL: https://journals.rcsi.science/0146-4116/article/view/175983
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.3103/S0146411619080339
- ID: 175983
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详细
Open Platform Communications (OPC), the interoperability standard for the secure and reliable exchange of data in the industrial automation space, consists of two main types of protocol – classic and unified. The paper reviews a classic set of DA/HDA/A&E protocols, which is based on Microsoft DCOM and RPC technologies. Architectural cyber threats of the classic type of OPC are systematized in this work.
作者简介
D. Zegzhda
Peter the Great St.Petersburg Polytechnic University
编辑信件的主要联系方式.
Email: dmitry@ibks.spbstu.ru
俄罗斯联邦, St. Petersburg, 195251
M. Kalinin
Peter the Great St.Petersburg Polytechnic University
编辑信件的主要联系方式.
Email: max@ibks.spbstu.ru
俄罗斯联邦, St. Petersburg, 195251
M. Levykin
Federal Research Center “Computer Science and Control,” Russian Academy of Sciences
Email: max@ibks.spbstu.ru
俄罗斯联邦, Moscow, 119333
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