Email this article Pareto-Like Equilibria for Differential Games with Side Interests of the Players
- Authors: Smol’yakov E.R.1
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Affiliations:
- Lomonosov Moscow State University
- Issue: Vol 53, No 12 (2017)
- Pages: 1654-1666
- Section: Control Theory
- URL: https://journals.rcsi.science/0012-2661/article/view/154653
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0012266117120126
- ID: 154653
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Abstract
For dynamic and static problems with side interests of the participants, new concepts of conflict equilibrium are proposed, which make it possible to find a solution that most satisfies all the participants, especially in those problems in which all known concepts of equilibrium turn out to be ineffective or unsuitable.
About the authors
E. R. Smol’yakov
Lomonosov Moscow State University
Author for correspondence.
Email: ser-math@rambler.ru
Russian Federation, Moscow, 119991
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