A New View of the Soviet Strategy on the eve of the Great Patriotic War

The review considers the latest monograph by A.A. Krivopalov, dedicated to mobilisation planning and military organisation in the USSR in 1926-1941. The monograph is an attempt to study the preparation of the USSR for the Great Patriotic War through the prism of grand strategy implemented by I.V. Stalin and his inner circle. The author of the review notes a fruitful attempt to trace the connection between the experience of the participation of the Russian Empire in the First World War and the actions of the Soviet leadership in the field of foreign policy and defense organisation. An important problem analysed in the monograph is highlighted - the mismatch of political and strategic goal-setting at the highest level of decision-making, which became the cause of the mistakes made in preparing the country for the Great Patriotic War. The conclusion is made about the significant contribution of the monograph to the historiography of the Great Patriotic War.

Great Patriotic War, mobilisation planning, preemption in strategic deployment, M.N. Tukhachevsky, G.S. Isserson