Henry Wilson’s Memorandum “Our Present and Future Military Policy in Russia” (November 13, 1918) as a Factor of the British Intervention Policy in Russia in November – December 1918

This article analyzes the memorandum "Our Present and Future Military Policy in Russia" dated November 13, 1918 as a factor in the policy of British intervention in Russia in November–December 1918. Its author was the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Henry Wilson, one of the most influential figures in the top leadership of the United Kingdom. The memorandum contained his point of view on the past, present and future of the British intervention policy in Russia. Due to its significance and informative value, this document is the object of research, the subject is its content as a factor of British intervention in domestic Russian affairs in November — December 1918. The author of the article aims to reveal the influence of the memorandum of the head of the Imperial General Staff on the policy of British intervention in Russia during this period. The work used retrospective, systemic and narrative methods. Thanks to them, the process of development of British politicy in November – December 1918 is shown; the relationship between the content of the document and the military-political situation, as well as their mutual influence, is presented; the content and nature of the memorandum are reflected in sufficient detail, focusing on the most important aspects for the topic of the work. The involvement of this document in the study of British intervention policy makes it possible to expand and deepen it, as it demonstrates the complex process of shaping this policy in detail, which gives the work a scientific novelty. The main conclusion of the study is that the main problems of Great Britain regarding interference in internal Russian affairs after the Armistice of Compiegne were the prevention of potential German influence in Russia and the containment of Bolshevism. Mr. Wilson proposed, as a modernized form of British intervention policy, to provide assistance to the newly formed states in the former Russian Empire and the Russian anti-Bolshevik forces to solve these two problems. The contents of the memorandum of the Head of the Imperial General Staff strongly influenced the decision of the War Cabinet of the United Kingdom to continue and strengthen the intervention policy in November–December 1918.

First World War, Armistice of Compiègne, Civil War, intervention, Bolshevism, Great Britain, War Cabinet, Imperial General Staff, H. Wilson, D. Lloyd George