

Perspectives of Turkish foreign policy based on analysis of Romanian documents

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Abstract. After 29 October 1923, when the status of the nation as a republic was declared and its official name was proclaimed to be Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ("the Republic of Turkey"), the officials followed a defensive policy and the Turkish status became part of defensive alliances. In this sense, treaties with the USSR were signed, Turkey was part of the Balkan Agreement and had agreements with Great Britain, France, etc. An increased attention was paid to the Balkan space where the legacy of the Ottoman Empire was visible. Ankara's diplomats appealed to the Turkish-Tatar communities that lived in the geographical area of Balkans to move to the new Turkish state. The Treaty of Lausanne and then the Treaty of Montreux were vital – in the first – for the security of the new Turkish state, but also for the states bordering the Black Sea. From political point of view, the main priority of the foreign Turkish policy was to pursue an alliances policy, seeking to maintain and consecrate by treaties its territorial integrity stability in its own influence areas.

Keywords: Turkey, Romania, Lausanne, League of Nations, USSR, Dobrogea, Tatars, Emigration

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Introduction

The transition from Empire to Republic did not prove to be easy, first because the Sultanate had become a true form of life; The Sultan was considered the chosen one of Allah, and he had to rule the Empire both religious and administrative. For Turkish society, the change in the form of government proved auspicious. But in the first place, Atatürk's reforms were received with suspicion. The main concern of the Turkish head of state was to obtain the country's independence, a fact achieved by the Lausanne Treaty of July 24, 1923, after which the foreign forces that had invaded it withdrew. From political point of view, the main priority of the foreign Turkish policy was to pursue an alliances

policy, seeking to maintain and consecrate by treaties its territorial integrity stability in its own influence areas.

The failure of the disarmament plans initiated after the First World War, the inability of the League of Nations to stop the revisionist states from seizing territories, to organize a system of collective security, are factors that led to the reconsideration of the Lausanne Conference, because what had been established in July 1923 did not meet the Turkish or the other states bordering the Black Sea requirements. During the debates regarding the issue of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits, two points of view appeared : on the one hand was the point of view of Turkey – which coincided with the USSR point of view – who wanted the militarization of the Straits in order to guarantee its own security, while the Soviet Union sought to make the Black Sea an area to control by restricting or canceling the entry of non-riverine warships, on the other hand, there was Great Britain's point of view, interested in protecting its maritime communication lines, in keeping somehow a form of international control by maintaining the Straits. In the end, the point of view of Turkey was adopted, which was recognized as having the right to rearm the areas that had been demilitarized at Lausanne. [1, p. 500].

1. Turkish foreign policy analysis in the reports of Romanian diplomats

In a report by Octavian Beu, First Secretary in Constantinople, to Ion Gh. Duca, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania, regarding Turkey's resumption of diplomatic relations with former neutral states during the First World War, it is stated that , the governments of the former neutral states expressed their desire to enter into negotiations with the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the resumption of diplomatic relations. Angora [Ankara] then replied that it was waiting for the end of the negotiations started with Bulgaria, after which the representatives of the other states would be immediately invited to negotiate the conclusion of a friendship treaty and possibly a commercial convention. However, as negotiations with the Bulgarians dragged on due to their demands, the Turkish government decided to invite Holland, Spain, Denmark and Czechoslovakia to send their delegations without delay to prepare diplomatic relations¹.

After so many conflicts and negotiations, President Mustafa Kemal gave a speech in the Grand National Assembly in which he analyzes Turkey's important milestones and traces its new path. Gheorghe Filality, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Constantinople, analyzed his speech. From the note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it appears that few nations have set the exam-

¹ Archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (AMAE – Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe, Bucharest), fond 71/1920–1944. *Turcia*, vol. 1, f. 48.

ple of such a rapid evolution in the transition from monarchy to a republican regime.

Referring to the economic and financial situation, the Turkish president acknowledged that due to the lack of adequate means, it is still not at the desired level and that not everything that was hoped for could be done. He expressed the same dissatisfaction referring to the situation of refugees, public education, etc. The Ghazi insisted on the railway policy, which he sees as the primordial condition and sine qua non of Turkey's prosperity and future.

Regarding the foreign debt, the President of the Republic finds it very natural for the Turks to respect past commitments as soon as the formalities stemming from the Treaty of Lausanne have been completed.

Finally, it follows from his speech that the Ghazi gives special importance to the agriculture improvement, the justice reorganization, the fight against malaria and the Angora [Ankara]reconstruction, which he is more determined than ever to keep it as the Capital of Turkey and raise it to the level of a modern city.

2. Turkey's political strategy in the interwar period

As for the state's relations with foreign Powers, it is worth noting the statement made regarding the Soviet Union, with which maintaining relations of cordial friendship constitutes one of the directives of Turkish policy [emphasis added. in the text – n.n.]. Relations with France and Italy have improved. Those with Poland are also amicable, and those with Persia and Afghanistan are friendly².

Also from a diplomatic note by Gheorghe Filality³, to Ion Gh. Duca, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania, regarding the statements of Şükrü Kaya-bey⁴, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, regarding Turkey's foreign policy guidelines we learn: *"We are not obedient to any foreign power. We are nothing but Turkophiles and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is the direct representative of the Assembly, can only follow and apply the program the Assembly set for him. Turkey's foreign policy, as like as the domestic policy, can only be national. Otherwise, this well-branded nationalism is more a pledge of peace than a matter of concern, for it means that the Turks are determined to attend exclusively to their own affairs, without casting a glance of envy or lust upon the possessions and property of others. The first external task of the government is to defend the national mete; the second is to maintain peace and the third is to avoid and forbid any interference by foreigners in its internal affairs. This triple principle is enough to explain our situation, as well as the difficulties in which we currently find ourselves with Great Britain and Greece"*. Moreover, Şükrü Kaya made

² AMAE, fond 71/1920–1944. *Turcia*, vol. 58, f. 74–75.

³ AMAE, fond 71/1920–1944. *Turcia*, vol. 1, f. 52–53.

⁴ Şükrü Kaya (1883–1959), Turkish politician. Minister of Foreign Affairs (21 Nov. 1924 – 4 Mar. 1925). Later Minister of the Interior (1927–1938).

then more than an allusion to the Mossul matter, repeating the ethnic and social reasons why he thinks it would be completely impossible for Turkey to be amputated by Mossul, Kerkuk [Kirkuk] and Suleymanié.

In the case of the relations between the League of Nations – Turkey : Turkey does not agree any international discussion on the issue of the Patriarch and declares in advance that Turkey will not pay any attention to the League of Nations decision, to which Turkey does not recognize the right to interfere in such a business.

Turkey continued to strengthen its foreign relations and even have an objective policy in accordance with its national interest. In Geneva, Dr. Tevfik Rüstü-bey received several representatives of the press to whom he declared that, the Turkish point of view on the Mossul⁵ issue being too well known, he does not see the need to insist on this matter. The minister showed that the Turkish delegation will energetically defend Turkey's rights over Mosul vilayet, as long as it is a matter of vital interest for his country. The Turks will propose, if necessary, the plebiscite in the contested region, under the supervision of neutral delegates appointed by the League of Nations; the Turkish government does not accept, however, to discuss the issue of extending the British mandate in Iraq, as was proposed by the commission of inquiry.

⁵ Reference to the Mossul vilâyet (a component part of the Ottoman Empire until 1918), whose status was the subject of a heated controversy between Great Britain (which had obtained its administration through the mandate of the League of Nations in 1920) and Turkey, especially during the Lausanne Conference. This established a temporary border (the "Brussels line"), which was to be replaced after nine months by a "friendly agreement" between the two states; the interest in the region was related to the important oil resources, which had previously been concessioned to the Turkish Petroleum Company (later the Iraqi Petroleum Company); the national movement led by Mustafa Kemal, through the National Pact of 1919, but especially after the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey, considered Mosul one of the crucial issues of Turkish foreign policy. Despite the opposition of the Ankara government, Great Britain, which had established (in 1921) the new Iraqi Kingdom led by Faysal I (with whom it also concluded a treaty in 1922), managed to bring the Mosul issue into the international arena, claiming that it is, in fact, a border issue between Turkey and the new Kingdom of Iraq. Mosul (with 600,000 inhabitants) was to be granted by the League of Nations to Iraq, and by the Border Treaty of 1926 the matter was regulated, in the sense that the Turkish government was to receive for 25 years 10% of the oil royalties paid by Iraq, in exchange for giving up the action to recover the vilayet. See Nevîn Çoşar, Sevtap Demirci, The Mosul Question and the Turkish Republic: before and after the Frontier Treaty, 1926, in "The Turkish Yearbook", Year XXXV /2004, p. 43–59 (with bibliography on the issue). The problem was temporarily resurrected during the Iraqi conflict at the end of the twentieth century.

The representative of Ankara declared that the negotiations for the conclusion of a trade agreement with Germany continue with all guarantees of success and that the Turkish government is, at the same time, on the verge of concluding a trade treaty with the Soviet Union⁶. "*The bases of this last treaty are already prepared and the conclusion will be made after our return from Geneva*"⁷.

Regarding the negotiations with Bulgaria, he acknowledged the existence of some difficulties that caused the interruption of the negotiations, but he hopes that on his return to Angora [Ankara] he will manage to remove the obstacles and reach the signing of the agreement. Relations with Serbia entered a normal phase by appointing a Turkish representative in Belgrade, who will work, like Živković in Constantinople, for the rapprochement of the two countries.

Regarding foreign policy, in relations with Western states, T.R. Aras, a Turkish diplomat, said: "French-Turkish relations are very friendly and I am not aware of the alleged dispute that arose between the delegates at the financial conference in Paris."

He wanted to show that the political situation in Turkey is currently, of course, dominated by the dispute with Great Britain and great efforts are being made to reach a favorable solution for Turkish interests. It is certain that Turkey will not go so far as to provoke a military action⁸.

3. The aspects of Turkish – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics relations analyzed through the lens of Romanian documents

After a discussion with the Turkish foreign minister, the Romanian representative in Turkey, Gheorghe Filality notes about relations with the Soviet Union and Great Britain: "Turkey and the Soviet Union. We have the closest ties with the Russians, not only because their representative, Mr. Souritch⁹, is a first-rate man, but also because we, the Turks, find indisputable profits in this friendship.

The Soviet Union, as you know, is a power that counts over 90 million Christians and 40 million Muslims, meaning our compatriots. How do you want to be not a community of interests between the two countries? The Russians do not do any kind of Bolshevik propaganda here, not only because Turkey is not a favorable place, but also because they are very vulnerable in their Muslim population, where we would not have any difficulty to speed things up/create disorder if necessary. We live, therefore, in the best harmony and we seek to put our economic relationships on the most productive basis.

⁶ A Turkish-Soviet trade and navigation treaty will only be concluded in 1937.

⁷ AMAE, fond 71/1920–1944. *Turcia*, vol. 1, f. 52–53.

⁸ AMAE, fond 71/1920–1944. *Turcia*, vol. 1, f. 56–57.

⁹ *Yakov Zaharovici Souritz* (1882–1952), Soviet diplomat. Ambassador to Ankara (1923–1934), Berlin (1934–1937) and Paris (1937–1940).

The Russians have no aggressive intentions against anyone, not even against you. Through our minister in Bucharest, I informed I.G. Duca that he should not have any anxiety about Bessarabia, because the Russians did not and do not have the slightest desire to make war for her. I have the faith that sooner or later you will end up coming to terms through mutual understanding and concessions. The Russians currently have only one "bête noire" that causes them a lot of concern: it is Great Britain. The struggle is old between these two peoples, and the dispute is more acute than ever, because the dispute is about who will dominate Asia"¹⁰.

For Romania, "to stay relaxed" was not a solution. Although the Turks believed that the Russians would not interfere in Bessarabia and sought to promote the "pacifist" policy of the Soviet Union in Europe, especially in the Balkans, the Romanian government maintained its state of alert vis-à-vis Moscow. The Turkish Foreign Minister, Tevfik Rustu Aras¹¹, asked by our minister in Turkey about Moscow's position towards the Locarno Pact, he stated:

"There is great nervousness in Moscow at the moment. The leaders seem to have lost their minds. It is indisputable that Great Britain in particular won a serious victory, that with the entry of Germany into the League of Nations the Treaty of Rapallo [1922]¹² no longer has much value and that the Soviet Union is today isolated [emphasis added. in the text]. How they will react and what they are planning to do, the future will tell us, because even they don't know yet, so serious and unexpected was the blow they received. They believed until the last moment that Germany would not accept France's proposals"¹³.

Also from the same diplomatic note we find the statements of the Turkish minister regarding Turkey and Great Britain. *"We wouldn't have anything to dispute with Great Britain if Mossul wouldn't exist. They are set out to steal it from us at any cost, not only because of the oil, but also because that only thanks to this region they could implement their world domination tendencies. Once masters of Mossul, they will not be able to sit still and they will seek to dominate the*

¹⁰ AMAE, fond 71/1920–1944. *Turcia*, vol. 1, f. 56–57.

¹¹ From Gheorghe Filality we learn that the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs is nicknamed by his friends: the Bolshevik. He lived in the Soviet Union and was the delegate of Turkish socialists to the Third International. Nothing more natural, then, than sympathy for the current Soviet rulers.

¹² Through the Treaty of Rapallo, signed on April 16 1922 by the representatives of the Weimar Republic and those of the Russian RSFSR, it was decided to normalize diplomatic and economic relations between the two countries. Its provisions were consolidated by the Berlin Pact of Neutrality and Non-aggression (April 24, 1926), for a period of five years, extended in 1931. See, at length, in the classic work of the British Edward Hallett Carr, *German-Soviet Relations between the Two World Wars 1919–1939*. London, 1952, passim.

¹³ AMAE, fond 71/1920–1944. *Turcia*, vol. 1, f. 59–61.

small Russian republics, seize the oil from Georgia by Baku and Batum, to encircle and thus to seize Persia – which they tried once before without success – and to extend to the Caucasus, their main target. We will not submit to English claims at any cost and we will go to war to regain our land. The decisions of the Court of Hague or the decision of the League of Nations leave us insensitive, because we do not recognize their right to judge in a business like this. The English will be forced to come to terms with us, because otherwise we will make their days bitter indefinitely.

Beyond all of this we are delighted that the matter of Mossul has been brought to light by the Great Britain. If we would want to invent something in this sense, we couldn't find anything better. Let me explain: After our formidable victory over the Greeks and once the territory was cleared of them, we with our rooted sluggishness would become laziness, and wouldn't take care for anything and less for the army. Even if we would ask the Assembly for credits for the army, the deputies would have refused us on the grounds that we no longer need an army. But the Mossul matter came, and kept us smart and sur le qui-vive¹⁴, it is the scarecrow we use to get everything we want from the Assembly. When we say: don't forget the Moss and the English tendencies to steal a piece of our body, we become irresistible and no one objects anymore. It was, I repeat, a real blessing".

"I add, however, that this business cannot remain open indefinitely, because our nervous tension might drive us to despair. Ghazi's first and greatest concern, and ours as well, is the army, which takes the third part of our budget, because thanks to it we are not slaves today and also thanks to it we want no one to be able to disregard our rights in the future"¹⁵.

Regarding France, Rustu Aras stated: "Mr. Albert Sarraut¹⁶ is a valuable man, I have the greatest respect for him, because he is one of those privileged people born to lead the destinies of their country. You can imagine how happy we are to have such a representative among us and how we will do everything not to displease him"¹⁷.

¹⁴ Etre sur le qui-vive, place. fr., to be on guard, alert.

¹⁵ AMAE, fond 71/1920–1944. *Turcia*, vol. 1, f. 61.

¹⁶ Albert Pierre Sarraut (1872–1962), French left-wing politician. Minister of Colonies (1920–1924), ambassador to Constantinople-Istanbul (March 1925 – July 1926); later Minister of the Interior (1926–1928, 1934, 1938–1940), Minister of the Navy (1930, 1933–1934) and the Military Navy (1930–1931), of the Colonies (1932–1933); President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of the Navy (1933), President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of the Interior (1936), Minister of National Education (1940). President of the Assembly of the French Union (1951–1958).

¹⁷ AMAE, fond 71/1920–1944. *Turcia*, vol. 1, f. 62–63.

This statement may express the views of the minister, but of course not those of the delegates in charge of negotiating the Syrian border issue, as well as the Consular Convention. The general belief is that France will not succeed in obtaining what she wants and that she will be able to sign only by accepting all the concessions claimed by the Turks.

4. Ankara's relations with the League of Nations

Rustu Aras, was asked by Romanian minister in Istanbul, Gheorghe Filality, if Turkey will enter the League of Nations like Germany, and he answered: *"I will absolutely enter that world areopagus. However, I will set certain conditions, because today equality between states exists only in words. I want us, the Balkans, to have the same rights as the great nations. So, for example, the elections in the Council will no longer have to be done like today, by individuals, but by states, so that I can be sure that Turkey's turn will come. When Mr. Beneš's candidacy is presented to me, obviously I can't not to vote for him; but if Czechoslovakia would come up, of course I would not vote for it, but I would continuously vote for Turkey until it too was elected.*

If the consolidation and prestige of the League of Nations are desired indeed, it is absolutely necessary that no one is treated as inferior and kept at the door, as is still customary at conferences organized by the great nations and where our interests are at stake, if not even our destinies"¹⁸.

The report of Gheorghe Filality to Ion Gh. Duca, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania, regarding his conversation with Albert Sarraut, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the French Republic in Turkey, regarding the reactions of the Turkish deputies regarding the decision of the League of Nations on the Mossul¹⁹ issue comes to nuance the positions of the two states.

"Mr. Sarraut told me that he left the governors extraordinarily depressed, because they did not expect such a severe sentence from the League of Nations; that they complained that they had been abandoned by France, who would have thought only to play England's game, and that, under these conditions, there was nothing left for them to do but to ally with the Russians, an alternative to which all of Europe pushed them. That they were surprised how none of the members of the Council of the League realized what Mossul represents in Asian politics and they all blindly voted for what the famous "Amery"²⁰ asked them to do.

¹⁸ AMAE, fond 71/1920–1944. *Turcia*, vol. 1, f. 68.

¹⁹ Reference to the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations of 16 Dec. 1925, by which Mosul was assigned to Iraq.

²⁰ Leopold Charles Maurice Stennett Amery (1873–1955), British Conservative politician. First Lord of the Admiralty (31 Oct 1922 – 24 Jan 1924), Secretary of State (Minister) for the Colonies (6 Nov 1924 – 4 Jun 1929).

It is undeniable that the sentence was too harsh and if the English, at least those from the Ministry of Colonies, were a bit more intelligent, they would realize that such a success does them more harm than good, because it exasperates not only the Turks, but also the 30 million Muslims in Asia, whom it would be better to have on their side than against them. Not to mention their inescapable fatality that through their procedures they pushed the Turks into the arms of the Russians, the oldest and most sincere ... enemies, for a long time.

I told the Angorians that I owed this complete failure at Geneva not only to the skill of the English, which, after all, is not so great, but also largely to their own mistakes. I don't think a more wretched tactic could have been used than the ones I witnessed.

The Turks, knowing full well that they were going to Geneva to see the Mosul matter settled, found nothing better to do than to undertake, at least a month before the appointed day, a campaign of extreme violent disparagement against the great world Areopagus: a gathering of people sold to the Great Britain, without conscience, without the slightest sense of justice, etc. No matter how indifferent those people were – mostly superiors – to such attacks, it is certain that they were not delighted, nor well-disposed towards the gossipers.

Their delegates, once they arrived in Geneva, instead of taking advantage of the unique opportunity that was offered to them to put the Mossul matter on exclusively political ground and in its full extent before the representatives of the 54 states – such an approach wouldn't have failed to impress the audience, which, whatever may say, is not entirely obedient to Great Britain – they acted like simple jurists, forcing the texts as in the courts, which the Council certainly did not like.

Finally, and even greater rudeness, the delegates took it all the time from above – as they do in Angora [Ankara] – they showed themselves to be mischievous or threatening, they slammed the doors and thus played with the greatest mastery the Englishmen's game of the with the greatest skill, who certainly rejoiced, because from that moment they had won the game.

I am sure and I assure you that the Turks would have achieved something serious in Geneva if they had not acted as they did. They only have what they deserve²¹.

Asked about the treaties with the Russians, the French diplomat opined:

"What can I think that could come out "d'un dépit des Russes après Locarno et des Turks après Genève". The Turks know very well that their eternal enemy, of yesterday, today and tomorrow, is the Russian, but what do you want them to do in the despair they are in? They bonded with the one who gave them a helping hand and what help, when they only promise to sit with folded hands? But

²¹ AMAE, fond 71/1920–1944. *Turcia*, vol. 1, f. 69.

this helping hand was due because of the fear that Great Britain would succede to attract the Turks, by bribes and concessions, on her side and in this way to tilt the balance of Asian politics in her favor.

For me this treaty "c'est un traité type de méfiance réciproque". With not much ability and much more understanding of the situation – Foreign Affairs knows it very well, but the English colonies are obstinate and obtuse – the British could have, perhaps they still could, with some concessions, make the Turks their friends, a fact that would constitute a very valuable asset in their fight with the Russians for Asia, which will be formidable and whose result no one can predict"²².

The opinion of the French diplomat had a dose of dissatisfaction also due to the fact that for two months while he waited in Ankara the president of the state, Mustafa Kemal, did not accepted his visit, and Ismet Inonu, the president of the Council of Ministers received him only once and then briefly.

5. Synthesis of Turkey's political situation in Mustafa Kemal's analysis

"Our foreign policy, which has long time taken as behavior line the maintenance of peace, is developing and gives positive results.

Our relations with the Soviet Union are amicable, sincere and based on the principles established by the security and neutrality treaties you have ratified. The work of delimiting the frontiers continues in the same favorable atmosphere. Negotiations on the conclusion of a trade treaty have made great progresses.

Our amicable relations with Persia have been consecrated by your ratification. We note with satisfaction the fruits of the efforts carried out by the Persian patriots in order to ensure the order and peace in the provinces in our neighbor, the progress, the national unity, a stable regime and a strong government. With Afghanistan, our relations are always committed to the path of sincerity as you know. The formalities for the delimitation of the Syrian and Mesopotamian borders are about to begin.

The treaties were conceived to ensure in an intended spirit the security and the good neighborly relations for both parties. I like to hope that the targeted objectives will be achieved with the same sincerity that presided over the drafting of those documents. Of course, this state of affairs will only be able to favorably influence our relations with France and Great Britain.

Our relations with the Powers of the West and of the Far East continue in the sincerity of the concluded treaties.

Negotiations to conclude a consular convention with France and Italy are progressing.

A trade treaty and a stability convention were concluded with Germany.

²² AMAE, fond 71/1920–1944. *Turcia*, vol. 1, f. 70.

We signed an interim trade agreement with the United States. This agreement will be submitted during this session for your approval.

As for the Army, which naturally constitutes Gazi's main concern, he said:

"You can be sure that your efforts for strengthening our land, naval and air forces are yielding fruitful results. The armies of the Republic, whose activity we follow closely, are morally and materially strong enough to ensure the integrity of the homeland and guarantee the peace of the nation. I declare it categorically"²³.

Regarding the Balkan Area, an area of major interest for Turkey, Tevfik Rüstü, launches some explanations over the situation of the goods possessed by the Turkish subjects in Yugoslavia. *"As you know, we concluded only a Treaty of Friendship with Serbia, and not an establishment convention. Until the conclusion of such an agreement, the citizens of the two parties are subject to the regime prescribed by international law. I admit that Yugoslavia is the only country that has not yet begun to return to the Turkish owners the goods they possessed on Serbian territory. The government in Belgrade, however, accepted in principle to make these restitutions and promised to make them as soon as possible. We are waiting for the fulfillment of this promise, which the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia repeated from the rostrum of the Parliament"²⁴.*

Regarding the agreements concluded with Greece, Tevfik Rüstü shows that, after the ratification of these agreements by the National Assembly, their text was communicated to the Joint Commission on the exchange of populations, which took measures to apply the stipulations included in the respective conventions : *"I am convinced that good results will be reached, because the two governments are animated by the same desire to establish good neighborly relations"²⁵.*

At the end of his speech, held in the Great National Assembly, on April 13, 1927, questioned by a deputy, asking for clarifications regarding the political situation in the Balkans, the Minister of Foreign Affairs gave the following clarifications:

We have always shown that we are partisans of a policy of sincere friendship with each of the Balkan countries and we have declared at the same time that we will take all the necessary measures to prevent the consequences of any agreement that we might consider directed against us"²⁶.

²³ AMAE, fond 1920–1944. *Turcia*, vol. 1, f. 127–129.

²⁴ AMAE, fond 1920–1944. *Turcia*, vol. 1, f. 154.

²⁵ AMAE, fond 1920–1944. *Turcia*, vol. 1, f. 155.

²⁶ AMAE, fond 1920–1944. *Turcia*, vol. 1, f. 155.

Turkish politics was concerned with two issues:

1) The fear that Great Britain would come to terms with the Soviet Union and thus Turkey would find herself crushed between the two giants. But knowing the current relations between the two states, which were colder than ever, this threat does not constitute an immediate danger;

2) Turkey feared to the highest degree, of Italy, which it believes is capable of a hasty action that could be decisive. Turkey was aware that Mussolini's imperial policy was based on demographic considerations. When the population of Italy has already reached 131 souls per km², when the birth rate increases by 5–600,000 per year, when emigration to America is decreasing because of the obstacles that are placed on it, when it is possible to accurately calculate the moment in that the Italians will no longer have a place in their country and when especially Mussolini, and d'Annunzio before, both of them not shy away from declaring that Anatolia would constitute an excellent Italian colony – they did not utter the word, but the idea was barely slightly veiled – what is more natural for the Turks than the desire to insure themselves against this undeniable danger by concluding an agreement with Italy.

Regarding Romania, Tevfik Rüstü-bey wanted the relations between the two states to progress: *"I am very pleased to know that at the helm of the Romanian Principate is a strong government that includes my friend Mr. Duca, which I met in Geneva when he was Minister of Foreign Affairs. Then I discussed with Mr. Duca the policy of our countries in the Balkans and we completely agreed on all the discussed points. Turkey, as Romania, pursues a policy of peace and rapprochement between the Balkan states and I see with joy the tightening of relations between these states.*

As long as Mr. Duca was in the government, I found in his Lordship the echo of my efforts for the implementation of the policy on which we had both agreed. After Mr. Duca left the Department of Foreign Affairs, there was a change in Romania's attitude towards us. Our minister in Bucharest always suggested a policy of close friendship with Romania, and I personally was a partisan of such a policy; however, but, I had the clear impression that our wishes did not find the expected echo in Bucharest. Then we naturally thought it was time to stay in reserve. However, the guiding line of my policy did not deviate and I did everything in my power to maintain good relations with your country. However, I cannot be asked to make a policy of insensitivity when it comes to the interests or prestige of my country. We, the governors of the Turkish Republic, are perhaps too susceptible, but the matter is explained, because we must not forget that we lead a new country that has nothing in common with the old Ot-

*toman Empire. This excess of susceptibility is perhaps a defective image of newly formed countries, but it is temporary image*²⁷.

In the Turkish press of May 2, 1923 (*IKDAM*), in an article about Romanian-Turkish relations, it was written: *"correct and appropriate actions towards the Turkish minority is a reason to develop our friendly relationship"*. The head of the new state Mustafa Kemal (1923): *"Indeed in order to have a friendship with the Balkans, we need to respect each other. We want to renew our relations with the neighbors as soon as possible"*. [2, p. 146]

Starting 1919, the phenomenon of emigration begins, the great majority of Turkish-Tatars emigrating to Turkey. This phenomenon was possible, as a consequence of the Lausanne Treaty in July 24-th, 1923, after the exchange population between Turkey and Greece. The Ankara officials have adopted a policy in support of the ethnic Turks by getting involved in the process of helping them to emigrate in Turkey. This is how the "Mirage of Anatolia" appeared in the next period after the First World War, which, as a consequence of the media propaganda, resulted in many requests for emigration. [3, p. 56]

Following the promises that in Turkey they will have an easy and prosperous life, the simple, naive people – many of them not knowing where Kemalist Turkey is – sold everything (for a small price), and ventured into wandering. At the same time, we learn from the newspaper "*Curentul*", that before the emigration issue to be solved by an agreement between the Turkish and Romanian states, the emigrants were deceived by the Romanian officials, who was asking for 4–5 thousand lei from the emigrants. Regarding young people, in order to be able to leave the country, they needed an administrative document, which legally cost 20 lei, but on the black market it could reach up to 1000 lei. This document was actually an exemption from military service, without which the young people could not leave the country. In the same newspaper, on May 17, the drama that the Turkish minority is going through, left on the roads in the winter of 1936–1937 is reported.

In a document from the National Archives of the Republic of Turkey – the fund/Special – General Directorate of Colonization within the Ministry of Health (!) – we learn about the method of taking over the money coming from the properties left behind by the emigrants who settled in Turkey. Thus from this document dated 1938 we learn that 311 families a total of 1216 people emigrated, the value of the buildings left in Romania amounting to 1,316,846 lei. Regarding the emigration process, following the transfer of the emigrants to Turkey, the amount of their real estate amounts to 16,805,892, of which the Turkish government has received so far 12,000,979 lei. At the same time, it appears that an

²⁷ AMAE, fond 71/1920–1944. *Turcia*, vol. 58, f. 154.

account was created at the National Bank of Roumania in the name of the Turkish state, depositing in this amount 16,805,892 lei.

Moreover, it is specified that following the agreement of both states on September 4-th, 1936 to bring the Turks from Dobrogea to Anatolia, between 1936–1937 real estate properties worth 12,000,979 lei remained in Romania. In Turkey, the Ministry of Health was the one that got involved in this problem and as a result of its intervention on February 2, 1938, it appeared in the Official Gazette, chapter 13, “the way in which the money resulting from the sale of real estate of Turkish emigrants to the Romanian state will be brought in Turkey”. Referring to the agreements between the states, it is specified that the money cannot be taken in cash. They can be taken as follows: “25% timber, 25% animals, 10% petroleum products, the remaining 40% being free export products: nails, glass, bricks.” In this case the Turkish Ministry of Finance, did not take any measures to bring this money into the country, the main reason being that this amount was divided in the form of products²⁸.

On March 9-th, 1934, Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver, the Turkish minister in Bucharest, sent a notice to the officials in Ankara regarding the situation of the Turks in Romania. According to this one, the status of the Turkish minority is nowhere near what it would be like. From this “notice” we learn that in the Romanian-Bulgarian border area there are 36 points of border guards, water is found at a distance of 15–20 km from the border and the Turkish villager is obliged to carry their water. At these “states of mind”, the government offered 200,000 lei for the purchase of wagons, animals and barrels, the soldiers being obliged to transport their own water. Moreover, the Romanian state is committed to solving these problems by April 18-th.

On October 3-rd, 1935, Şükrü Kaya, the Turkish Minister of the Interior, met with the Romanian ambassador, Eugen Filotti, to find solutions regarding the issue of emigration from Dobrogea to Turkey. It was concluded that the emigration process must be stipulated in an agreement between the two states. After a series of meetings and proposals, on September 4-th, 1936, the Convention regarding the emigration of the Turkish population from Dobrogea was signed. [4, p. 235]

Following the September 4-th, 1936 agreement, point IV, the real estate properties of the Turkish emigrants became the property of the Romanian state, which obliged itself to pay their value. It is also specified that the price of one hectare was worth 6,000 lei. At the VI-th Point of the same agreement it is specified the way the money will be paid, namely in annual installments. The money

²⁸ T. C. Sahhat ve Ictimai Muavenet Vekaleti no. 123 880 2, f.3 (in Turkish)

will be deposited in an account at the National Bank of Roumania. In 1937, the number of emigrants who arrived in Turkey was 3,600²⁹.

Once the socialist – totalitarian regime was established in Romania, there was no more involvement in supporting the minorities, in some places the regime even hindered them. Moreover, in 1965 with the occasion of The Medgidia Seminary, the only institution involved in the education of this ethnic group, with teaching the Turkish language and reading the Koran in Arabic, with the training of clergy to become imams, was forced to close its activity. The Turko-Tatars did not establish their own (ethnic) party, because they had several political options, being present on the electoral lists of the main parties, the National-Peasant Party and the National-Liberal Party, some of them being elected in the Romanian Parliament. The Romanian governments did not encourage the emigration of the Turkish-Tatars, because their departure could have changed the ethnic balance in favor of the Bulgarians ethnics, used by the governments in Sofia on their campaign of reviewing the Dobrogean border.

6. Dobrogea, the link of Romanian-Turkish cooperation

For centuries, Dobrogea has been a passageway for many migratory peoples. During the period of migrations, the Byzantine power weakened in this edge of the empire, which caused the decline of the Danube cities also. The autochthonous population of Dobrogea felt the passing of the: Pechenegs, Cumans, Tatars, etc. Starting from the 14-th century Dobrogea came under Turkish rule for 500 years. In the 16th and 18th centuries the Turks bring here the Nogai Tatars from Bugeac and Crimea. In the 19th century, the malorusii and the lipovenii from Ukraine [5, p. 529] appear in Dobrogea.

During this period, even if several cultures accumulated in Dobrogea, the dominant one was the Turkish-Tatar one. Another important aspect of the province was its strategic settlement. This facilitated access to Constantinople and allowed communication with the Crimean Peninsula. For these reasons, an intense military colonization was carried out, coming especially from Crimea and Asia. The settlement of the Tatars in Dobrogea was a long process started from the 13th century.

Historian Kemal Karpat, a native of Dobrogea, evaluated the emigration phenomenon of Crimean Tatars. In his analysis, the important moment was that of 1783 (the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula) and then the emigration wave of 1855–1856, before of the Paris Peace Treaty conclusion which ended the Crimean War. Crimeans chose to emigrate en masse, some in Dobrogea, others in Anatolia:

²⁹ T.C. Hariciye Vekealeti, no. 2476686 of April 9, 1934, f.5. (In Turkish)

"The Sublime Porte decided to help those willing to emigrate; before the ratification of the peace of Paris. A commission was established to deal with the transport and reception of immigrants. Immigration was possible for all, regardless of nationality, and the Sublime Gate offered new immigrants free land, work cattle, and a financial aid in procuring seeds and agricultural tools. The port of Balçık was designated as a disembarkation point for those who were to settle in Dobrogea." [6, p. 97]

The exact number of Crimean Tatars who left their homeland is not known. From Ottoman sources we learn that between 1854 and 1860, 141,667 tatars emigrated and between 1860 and 1862, 227, 627 tatars emigrated. The total number of tatar emigrants from Crimea in 1864 is supposed to have been 595,000 [7, p. 98].

The incorporation of Dobrogea into the Romanian state in 1878 represents a decisive act in modern history as well as a model of coexistence in the region. The Romanian authorities are committed in treating the residents of the two counties, Constanța and Tulcea, without discrimination. To strengthen these commitments, Carol I, the King of Romania, read a Proclamation on November 14, 1878³⁰ in Romanian, Turkish and Bulgarian:

"To residents of any nationality and religion, Dobrogea, the old possession of Mircea cel Bătrân (Mircea the Elder), is now part of Romania. You are now tied to a State, where not the arbitrary will, but only the law debated and approved by the nation, decides and governs. The most sacred and precious possessions of mankind, life, honor, and property, are placed under the shield of a constitution which many foreign nations covet. Your religion, your family, the threshold of your house, will be protected by our laws, and no one will be able to strike them, without receiving their wicked punishment.

Muslim Residents, Romania's justice knows no distinction of race and religion. Your faith, your family will be defended as like as the Christians's. The religion and family affairs will be entrusted to be protected by muftis and judges chosen from your nation and your law" [8, p. 101]

Ion Ionescu de la Brad, the founder of Romanian Agricultural Science, concluded in his records:

"Since the loss of Ismail, the Crimean Tatars crossed the Danube and colonized Dobrogea. This colonization of the country caused it to be called The Country of the Tatars". In 1850, he stated: "the Turks occupied the shores of the Black Sea, the Wallachians occupied the banks of the Danube, and the Tatars occupied the interior". [9, p. 532]

³⁰ Dobrogea Day.

A lot has been written about Dobrogea, each of the authors trying to decipher what was the cultural contribution of the different populations that came here. I think that from this point of view, the geographer Vintilă Mihăilescu's opinion is the best to illustrate the reality: "*Dobrogea is not only an exclusively Balkan or Carpathian region but, by its constitution, it is an association of Carpathian and Balkan regions and, by its geographical position, a terminal edge zone of Romania and a passage zone between the Continental Europe and the Southern Europe.*" [10, p. 536]

According to the 1930 census, 0.9% of the Romania's population was represented by turks. The great majority of turkish population was located in Dobrogea representing 18,5% of the total population in Dobrogea. Since 1919, the Turkish-Tatar emigration had begun and the vast majority of them chose to emigrate in Turkey. The emigration was also possible as a result of the Lausanne Treaty July 24, 1923, which decided, among other things, to carry out a population exchange between Turkey and Greece, opening the tradition of emigration. [11, p. 59]

The establishment of Romanian authority in Dobrogea was a difficult moment for the Muslim population who previously represented the majoritary population with a distinct religion and language, with an Ottoman identity. The Turks and Tatars adapted to the new conditions, meaning a new official language, Christian leaders, living in a permissive legislative framework for minorities. The years 1918–1925, the end of the Great War, the Paris Peace Treaties (1919–1920) where the situation of minorities was widely debated, can be concluded as a defining stage on the integration way of the national minorities in the composition of the Romanian unitary national state. Political and cultural structures were created, ideas were exchanged. The law for administrative unification (July 1925) was the point of finalizing the administrative-territorial organization process of Romania established in 1918. [12, p. 117]

According to this law and the Constitution of 1923, Romanian citizens, regardless of nationality, race, language and faith, had the opportunity to participate, under full equality conditions, to the entire political, economic, social and cultural life of the country.

Conclusion

The delimitation between the Empire and the Republic is evident in the minister's statements: "*Between the former Ottoman Empire and the current Turkish Republic there is a profound difference not only in regarding the concept of government, but also in everything related to foreign policy. The old sultans empire speculated on conflicts or disagreements between foreign powers, while today Turkey not only does not seek to profit from such disputes or differences, but*

even sincerely wants harmony to reign among the states with which it maintains good relations"³¹.

Romanian-Turkish relations have experienced a continuous development. Romania and Turkey tried to support each other having similar policies regarding the vision of preserving territories integrity of the, and having a collaboration based on the principles adopted by the Paris Peace Treaties in 1919–1920. Considering that a significant minority of Turkish-Tatars was located in Dobrogea, Turkey got involved in helping them, negotiating with the Romanian state to facilitate certain requirements, or proposing their emigration. In Romanian-Turkish relations, until 1928, was observed a reserved approach, the reasons being Turkey's diplomacy connections with the USSR and the issue of compensation for Turkish emigrants from Dobrogea. As a result of the declaration of the Romanian foreign minister Nicolae Titulescu, in the spring of 1928, in which he spoke for "the development of good relations with all countries, without distinction", the Turkish foreign minister replied that "Romania and Turkey are pursuing a policy of peace and rapprochement between the Balkan states and I see with joy the tightening of relations between the two countries"³².

The Romanian-Turkish relations developed between 1928–1934 through common security and cooperation agreements. In order to achieve security in the area, the friendship and non-aggression agreement between Romania and Turkey was signed on October 17-th, 1933. The rapprochement between Turkey and Greece and the co-optation of Yugoslavia and Romania transformed into the Balkan Pact. An assurance for border security were promised.

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Перспективы турецкой внешней политики на основе анализа румынских документов

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Аннотация. После провозглашения 29 октября 1923 г. Турецкой республики («*Türkiye Cumhuriyeti*»), официальные лица государства начали придерживаться оборонительной политики, а турецкий статус стал частью оборонительных союзов. Были подписаны договора с СССР, Турция являлась частью Балканского пакта и имела соглашения с Великобританией, Францией и т.д. Пристальное внимание уделялось балканскому пространству, где оставалось заметным наследие Османской империи. Дипломаты Анкары обратились к турецко-татарским общинам, проживающим на территории Балкан, с призывом переехать на территорию Турецкой республики. Лозаннский договор и Конвенция Монтрё, были жизненно необходимы – в первую очередь – для безопасности молодого турецкого государства, а также и для государств, расположенных в акватории Черного моря. С политической точки зрения, главным приоритетом внешней политики Турции было проведение политики союзничества, стремление сохранить и закрепить договорами свою территориальную целостность и стабильность в зонах своего влияния.

Ключевые слова: Турция, Румыния, Лозанна, Лига Наций, СССР, Добруджа, татары, эмиграция

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