电邮这篇文章 Pareto-like equilibria for problems on overlapping game sets
- 作者: Smol’yakov E.R.1
-
隶属关系:
- Faculty of Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics
- 期: 卷 93, 编号 3 (2016)
- 页面: 251-255
- 栏目: Mathematics
- URL: https://journals.rcsi.science/1064-5624/article/view/223670
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S1064562416030030
- ID: 223670
如何引用文章
开放存取
##reader.subscriptionAccessGranted##
订阅存取
详细
The new notion of an individually Pareto equilibrium for static and dynamic conflict problems with partially overlapping game sets is proposed; this equilibrium turns out to be nonempty even in those cases where all known equilibria are empty.
作者简介
E. Smol’yakov
Faculty of Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics
编辑信件的主要联系方式.
Email: ser-math@rambler.ru
俄罗斯联邦, Moscow, 119991
补充文件
