Scenarios for Russia’s Future in Eurasia
- Authors: Burrows M.1
-
Affiliations:
- Stimson Center
- Issue: No 5 (2025)
- Pages: 17-28
- Section: International relations
- URL: https://journals.rcsi.science/0869-0499/article/view/360020
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.7868/S2712910125050023
- ID: 360020
Cite item
Abstract
The Stimson Center based in Washington, D.C., undertook a project to consider plausible futures for the Russian Federation in Eurasia over the five-to-fifteen-year period to 2040. Three cycles of research were carried out, each from a different thematic or geographic angle. Accordingly, the first cycle scenarios were developed from the perspective of the Global South; the second – the Central Asia and Caucasus; the third – the Middle East. In almost all the 12 scenarios, there was a consensus that 15 years from now Russia will remain a great power in Eurasia. A withering or fragmentation of Russia was not predicted. Unsurprisingly, views differed on Russia’s future relationship with China and the positioning of Russia in the future US-China dynamic. Differences arose over who would be the other power players in Eurasia. One scenario envisaged Islamic states becoming a pillar opposite the other great powers, but that view was not shared widely. Non-Western experts saw the West playing a decreasing economic and military role in Eurasia. Trumpism would likely outlast the President’s second term and this would feed competition among the great powers. One of the disturbing findings is that nuclear weapons proliferation is likely in Eurasia by 2040. The research also showed Russia’s resiliency as a global player but highlighted the difficult choices facing it from overdependence on hydrocarbons to technological innovation challenges and weakening population growth without immigration. With Russia slow to focus on climate as a driver of change for the rest of the world, the global shift toward a greener world economy will place unique challenges on Russian leaders in the coming decades. Russia had the capacity to be a “renewables” giant but would probably require foreign investment to accomplish. Still, Russia had been better at positioning itself for a multipolar future than Western powers.
Keywords
About the authors
M. Burrows
Stimson Center
Author for correspondence.
Email: mburrows@stimson.org
Washington, USA
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