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Islamic Populism and Its Effects on Social Capital and Democracy: Evidence from Indonesian Presidential Elections¹

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Abstract. This study examines the profound influence of Islamic populism on the 2019 Indonesian presidential election and its influence on the 2024 election. It analyzes how the main candidates, Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto, utilized religious sentiments in their campaign strategies. By the time of 2024 presidential election, it highlights the emerging strategies presidential candidates adopted to attract voters. Successful candidates garnered substantial support from the previous supporters of President Joko Widodo, convincing them to shift their allegiance.

By employing a strategy that resonates with the majority and boosts a candidate's visibility and appeal, candidates increase their likelihood of winning. The study relies on academic literature and election result data to parse regional voting patterns and their implications for Indonesia's political landscape.

Indonesian presidential elections in 2024 demonstrated a discernible shift towards candidates who blend Islamic values with pluralism. The study concludes that aligning with the incumbent president's network has significant influence on electoral success. This strategy significantly strengthens a candidate's appeal to voters.

Keywords: populism, Islam, democracy, social capital, Indonesia, presidential election

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INTRODUCTION

This paper examines the impact of Islamic populism in the context of Indonesia's 2019 presidential election and its influence on the 2024 election that resulted in victory of Prabowo Subianto who became the new President. In the 2019 presidential election, incumbent President Joko Widodo (often known as 'Jokowi') defeated his rival, Prabowo Subianto, using a populist approach. By 2024, Joko Widodo reached the end of his two presidential terms; Prabowo Subianto emerged victorious in the presidential election, becoming Indonesia's next leader.

In the 2024 presidential election, attempts were made to boost appeal among the majority of Indonesians [2]. If conservative Islam had a great appeal with religious identity and feeling in 2019, by 2024 it gave way to moderate Islam, which is reaching all sectors of society as a weapon of social mobilization or as an electoral tactic [2]. As a result, in Indonesia, populism has evolved into a technique for appealing to the public. Therefore, the idea is to capitalize on the former president's popularity and support to draw public attention to the program's sustainability, which was initiated by the present president [3]. Thus, this technique is vital in gaining support from all strata of society, resulting in this endeavor to win one round of the election.

Prabowo Subianto is a former army commander who has been an influential figure in Indonesian politics for decades, despite defeats in presidential elections in 2014 and 2019. Prabowo Subianto ran for president of the Republic of Indonesia again in 2024, but this time he tried to appear more relaxed, showed that he enjoys dancing, and avoided using aggressive body language. Prabowo Subianto's social media profiles, which include Instagram, TikTok, YouTube, and a Facebook profile, were also appealing and straightforward, catering to younger people [4].

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The patterns from 2019 provide a basic understanding, but the evolving nature of populism requires careful observation of new trends and social changes [2].

The next general election took place on February 14, 2024, and the national vote counting was done from February 15 to March 20, 2024. According to the General Election Commission, this counting included votes from 38 provinces and 128 overseas election committees. The Commission announced Prabowo Subianto and Gibran Rakabuming Raka as the winning presidential and vice-presidential candidates for 2024–2029.

CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIC POPULISM

In the field of political science, Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell are noted scholars whose research focuses on the dynamics of populism across various political landscapes. Together they analyzed populist movements and significantly contributed to our understanding of this phenomenon. In their exploration of populism, they engage with the work of Vedi R. Hadiz, another distinguished scholar known for his critical analysis of political and social transformations in Indonesia and beyond. These academicians collectively contribute to the broader discourse on populism, a term that often evokes diverse interpretations within academic and public debates. Albertazzi, McDonnell, and Vedi R. Hadiz characterize populism as an ideology where society perceives itself in the struggle against a corrupt elite. People accuse this elite of enacting policies that benefit a minority, at the expense of the public majority. This ideology encapsulates a unified majority, diverse in ethnicity and class, confronting political elites perceived as threats to national sovereignty and interests, encompassing national economics, cultural values, and identity [3]. Western populism often emerges in response to globalization's social and economic impacts, such as international trade and investments perceived by some as threatening to national economic interests, a sentiment evident in recent years in the US and Western Europe [3].

Islamic populism parallels this narrative, positing that governments are not aligning with Muslim interests, potentially working against their political, economic, and social welfare. Vedi Hadiz distinguishes between colonial and postcolonial Islamic populism [3]. The former, emerging under colonial rule – French, British, Portuguese, Dutch – was defensive, aimed at establishing an Islamic state and repelling foreign domination, with Islamic identity marking the distinction between colonized and colonizers [4]. The latter, postcolonial or modern Islamic populism, surfaces after independence. Here, people perceive governments as neglecting Muslim interests, even though they share the same religion with their populace. This modern variant advocates not for creating an Islamic state but for elevating Muslims' social and political status within the state and society, emphasizing a shift in social and political dynamics rather than religious governance, which is pertinent in nations like Turkey, Egypt, and Indonesia [4].

AN ISLAMIC POPULISM LED BY JOKO WIDODO

Joko Widodo epitomizes populist leadership, ascending from Surakarta mayor to Indonesia's president, distancing himself from traditional elite politics [9]. His tenure in Surakarta, marked by a humanitarian, Javanese approach, prioritized dialogue and grassroots issues. Three key incidents exemplify his populist style: the peaceful relocation of Kali Lima Traders, and preserving the historic Saripetojo Ice Factory against modern development. This hands-on method exemplifies his commitment to accessibility and responsiveness, distinguishing his leadership style by emphasizing direct public engagement and the importance of being in touch with the populace's needs. These actions solidified Joko Widodo's democratic credibility, appealing to diverse interests, including the elite, and establishing him as a people-oriented leader [3].

Joko Widodo's 2012 Jakarta gubernatorial victory and subsequent 2014 presidential win (53.15% of votes) underscored the appeal of his technocratic populism [3]. His governance, characterized by humility, strong work ethic, and focus on inclusive development, resonated with voters, distinguishing him from traditional politics. Joko Widodo's appeal went beyond mass popularity, underpinned by strategic engagement with Islamic institutions and alliances with influential Islamic leaders. Among these alliances, his partnership with Ma'ruf Amin is notably significant. Ma'ruf Amin, a respected Islamic scholar and the former head of the "Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)", Indonesia's largest Islamic organization, brought considerable religious influence to Joko Widodo's administration. By aligning with Ma'ruf Amin, who later became his Vice President in the 2019 election, Joko Widodo bolstered his credentials within Islamic communities, illustrating a savvy blend of

political and religious engagement to broaden his support base. He promoted Islamic economic growth, advocating for Islamic finance and halal tourism, avoiding divisive tactics like anti-Chinese sentiments [6]. This pragmatic governance ensured Joko Widodo's policies remained relevant [7], reflecting his adept navigation of Indonesia's complex political landscape and evolving currents of Islamic populism [11].

THE ISLAMIC POPULISM OF PRABOWO SUBIANTO

Prabowo Subianto's aristocratic background² contrasts starkly with Joko Widodo's grassroots origins³. However, despite his claims to populism, Prabowo Subianto's elite background raises doubts about his authenticity as a populist leader. His adoption of ultranationalist and anti-imperialist narratives draws parallels with the rhetoric of Indonesia's first president, Sukarno, who led the nation from its independence⁴ [5]. Prabowo Subianto's campaigns often employ grandiose claims, manipulating public perception against foreign and ethnic Chinese influences. His strategy exploits collective fears, potentially threatening social cohesion [13].

Prabowo Subianto's speeches, painting a bleak picture of governance, rally support for his transformative vision, attributing Indonesia's challenges to foreign plots and advocating for institutional reforms [6]. He aligns with Islamic groups like the Islamic Defenders Front, capitalizing on anti-Joko Widodo sentiments and presenting himself as a pro-Islamic alternative. His emphasis on issues like PKI resurgence⁵ and concerns about Chinese influence resonate strongly with influential Islamic factions, solidifying his support base and presenting himself as a champion of Islamic interests [6]. Many political observers believed Prabowo Subianto would keep relying on extreme Islamic groups that had supported him in the 2019 presidential election [9].

Indeed, in 2024, Prabowo Subianto maintained connections with extreme Islamic organizations like the Islamic Defenders Front, particularly via Fadli Zon, who actively supports the group. As General Chairperson of Gerindra (Great Indonesia Movement Party), one of Indonesia's largest parties, Prabowo Subianto named Fadli Zon as Deputy General Chairperson [12].

Additionally, Prabowo Subianto also had backing from the Middle East Alumni Ulama Alliance and the hardline Islamic Indonesian Muslim Lawyer Alliance [12]. Islamic groups backed Prabowo in the 2024 presidential election. Despite Prabowo not showing expression of support, his deputies and National Campaign Team worked with grassroots radical Islamic and right-wing organizations to maintain support for the 2024 presidential elections.

Moreover, Prabowo also collaborated with Muhammad Luthfi, a respected Islamic scholar and the Chairman of the World Sufi Muslim Council 2023 [9]. Moderate and extremist Islamic groups collaborated to succeed at the 2023 International Sufi Congress. Hundreds of Islamic scholars from that event supported Prabowo Subianto – Gibran Rakabuming Rakan in the 2024 presidential race.

JOKO WIDODO'S VICTORY IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

The 2019 presidential elections marked a Joko Widodo vs. Prabowo Subianto rematch. Joko Widodo – Ma'ruf Amin duo triumphed with a decisive 16,957,123 vote margin, securing 55.5% of the total votes after a polarizing 7-month campaign. Their victory was particularly notable as it spanned 21 of Indonesia's 34 provinces and was backed by a nine coalition of a total of 13 political parties. Conversely, Prabowo Subianto – Sandiaga Uno, backed by 4 parties, prevailed in 13 provinces, notably in West Sumatra and West Java [7]. Therefore, Prabowo Subianto took lessons from his defeat by Joko Widodo in the presidential election

² Prabowo Subianto hailing from a prominent Indonesian military and political family, embodies an aristocratic background that sets him apart in Indonesian politics.

³ Joko Widodo who rose from a modest upbringing as a furniture entrepreneur to become the mayor of Surakarta and then the governor of Jakarta before his presidency, epitomizing a grassroots origin story.

⁴ Soekarno was known for his fervent opposition to colonialism and imperialism, shaping Indonesia's foreign policy during his time in power from 1945 until 1967. By invoking Soekarno's rhetoric, Prabowo Subianto seeks to appeal to nationalist sentiments and evoke memories of Indonesia's struggle for independence.

⁵ The term "PKI resurgence" was an Indonesian Communist Party (Indonesian: PKI) political party in Indonesia that was disbanded in the mid-1960s following a violent anti-communist purge. Refers to fears or perceptions of a revival or re-emergence of communist influence in contemporary Indonesian politics.

twice before, by forming a coalition and taking many ideas and work programs from Joko Widodo that Subianto used in his 2024 campaign [7]. As a result, by employing populist rhetoric aimed at appealing to the broad masses, Prabowo Subianto’s campaign managed to significantly shift the balance of public opinion in his favor. This was evidenced by the widened margin of victory compared to the 2019 presidential election. In 2024, Prabowo Subianto won against the two opponents, but with a wider margin. Specifically, in 2024, Prabowo Subianto secured a victory with a margin of approx. 10 mln votes, representing a tight contest widened as shown below (see table 1) [10].

Table 1. Results of the Presidential Elections

	2019		2024		
	Joko Widodo – Ma’ruf Amin	Prabowo Subianto – Sandiaga Uno	Anies Baswedan – Muhaimin Iskandar	Prabowo Subianto – Gibran Rakabuming Raka	Ganjar Pranowo – Mahfud MD
Number of Votes	85,607,362	68,650,239	40,971,906	96,214,691	27,040,878
Percentages	55.50%	44.50%	24.94%	58.58%	16.46%
Total Number of Votes	154,257,601		164,227,475		

Based on: [10].

Source: <https://doi.org/10.2991/aicosh-19.2019.59> (accessed 15.03.2024)

By taking lessons from the 2019 election which highlights Islamic populism’s profound impact on political strategies [4], Joko Widodo – Ma’ruf Amin’s narrative promoted pluralism and a moderate Islamic stance, aligning with Indonesia’s Pancasila principles and focusing on minority protection [9]. In contrast, Prabowo Subianto’s narrative catered to conservative Islamic patterns, engaging with radical groups aspiring for an Islamic caliphate.

This divergence in narratives significantly influenced the election outcome. Joko Widodo’s victory, bolstered by support from influential Islamic figures and his appeal in non-Muslim regions, reflected a preference for a moderate Islamic approach over Prabowo Subianto’s alignment with conservative potentially radical Islamic groups, demonstrating the decisive role in shaping the level of Islamic Populism in Indonesia as shown below (see diag.) [10].




Diagram. The Level of Islamic Populism in Indonesia (%).

Based on: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute Research Centre [10].

Source: <https://repository.uinjkt.ac.id/dspace/handle/123456789/68223> (accessed 15.02.2024)

Based on our findings, 16.3% of Indonesians in 2020 favored pro-Islamic populism, while 33.9% favored anti-Islamic populism. Despite its relatively small percentage, what Islamic populists lack in numbers is more than compensated for by their militant and active mobilization capabilities [13].

POLITICAL TRUST, SOCIAL CAPITAL, AND DEMOCRACY

Political trust in institutions and the state is critical to democracy's long-term viability, and it is a component of social capital. It manifests itself in political party support, election participation, and trust in institutions like the police and the Constitutional Court [5].

Social capital, especially faith in political institutions and the state, is critical to democracy's survival. Presidential elections in 1999, 2004, and 2009 demonstrate Indonesia's democratic journey, characterized by high levels of trust in political institutions and a lack of false news or large-scale protests against election results [9].

Disagreements were resolved by legal means, garnering Indonesia's worldwide credit as a successful Muslim-majority democracy. The success of these elections, despite ideological differences and historical confrontations between Islamic and secular parties, demonstrates Indonesia's capacity to develop interpersonal and political trust. The rivalry did not lead to polarization or disregard for legal conflict resolution. Political and community leaders successfully addressed challenges, exhibiting strong social capital.

However, the growth in political skepticism, particularly among Islamic populists, is worrying. Experts attribute this skepticism to a variety of issues.

First, sentiments of marginalization may diminish trust by creating perceptions of governmental bias against certain groups.

Second, limited social connection across foundational lines, such as race and religion, reduces trust, because it impedes understanding and tolerance of other beliefs and views.

Third, activities inside specific religious groups that foster hostility or distrust might worsen the situation [8].

These findings highlight the importance of civic involvement and virtue in building confidence in governmental institutions. The last two points emphasize the need for inclusive social contact and a shared commitment to civic ideas in order to sustain and increase trust throughout political systems and institutions.

EXAMINING THE DYNAMICS OF THE 2019 AND 2024 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

The 2024 Indonesian presidential election included diverse coalitions, with Anies Baswedan, a prominent political figure known for his tenure as the Governor of Jakarta, having secured endorsements from 3 political parties, signaling his significant role in the election. Ganjar Pranowo, another influential leader currently serving as the Governor of Central Java, was supported by 4 parties, underlining his strong political backing.

Prabowo Subianto, known for his previous presidential bids, had formed a notable partnership with Gibran Rakabuming Raka. Gibran made his political debut, following in the political footsteps of his father, namely becoming mayor of Surakarta. This collaboration is backed by major parties such as Golkar and PAN (National Mandate Party), indicating a broad base of support. Additionally, Prabowo Subianto's party, Gerindra (Great Indonesia Movement Party), actively sought alliances with other parties, reflecting a dynamic political scene. President Joko Widodo favorable remarks showed his support for Gibran as a vice-presidential candidate, showcasing his significant influence on the election's dynamics [6].

Despite a numerical minority, Islamic populists were a formidable voting force, as demonstrated by Prabowo Subianto's resilient performance in 2019, securing 44.5% votes despite resource limitations and a smaller coalition [5].

PRABOWO SUBIANTO – GIBRAN RAKABUMING RAKA STRATEGY FOR WINNING VOTES

Joko Widodo's administration demonstrated achieving economic stability, particularly by managing prices during the pandemic and symptoms of the global economic crisis, as well as enhancing community welfare and lowering poverty rates [9].

Because of their high degree of satisfaction with Joko Widodo's government's performance, the long-term viability of Joko Widodo's agenda is an essential consideration in their political choices⁶. The Prabowo

⁶ As of December 2023, the level of public satisfaction with President Joko Widodo's performance was at 74% with the level of public trust in the president at 86.1% (CSIS, 2023).

Subianto – Gibran Rakabuming Raka team was regarded as promising to continue their work. The Prabowo Subianto – Gibran Rakabuming Raka vision and mission made reference to Joko Widodo 17 times.

According to 2024 exit poll data Centre for Strategic and International Studies and Cyrus Network Research Institute (CSIS – CN), 29% of Joko Widodo-Ma’ruf Amin voters in the 2019 elections backed the Prabowo Subianto – Gibran Rakabuming Raka ticket in the 2024 elections (see *Table 2*). Aside from that, the continuance of Joko Widodo’s development-focused policy resulted in a high level of popular satisfaction with the Joko Widodo – Ma’ruf Amin government’s performance, at 74%, even as his tenure came to its end.

Table 2. Cross Tabulation Between the Presidential and Vice Presidential Candidate Choices in the 2019 Election and the Presidential and Vice Presidential Candidate Choices in the 2024 Election

2019	2024				Total
	Anies Baswedan – Muhaimin Iskandar	Prabowo Subianto – Gibran Rakabuming Raka	Ganjar Pranowo – Mahfud MD	Forgot / No Answer	
Joko Widodo – Ma’ruf Amin voters, 2019	10.27%	29.01%	16.50%	2.65%	100.00%
Prabowo Subianto – Sandiaga Uno voters, 2019	11.39%	17.71%	1.06%	0.93%	
Secret / Forgot / No Answer	2.83	2.77%	1.03%	3.86%	

Based on: [9].

Source: <https://www.csis.or.id/publication/strategi-perolehan-suara-lintas-generasi-prabowo-gibran-pada-pemilihan-umum-2024/> (accessed 15.03.2024)

Despite previously stating that he would not campaign, President Joko Widodo had shown support for specific candidate combinations on multiple occasions.

On January 5, 2024, President Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto were spotted having supper together. Even though the president’s special staff said that the two parties were simply having dinner with no specific goal, many parties believed that the president was sending a signal about the direction of his support in the 2024 elections.

Aside from that, on billboards along the roadways, Joko Widodo’s image was frequently paired with that of Prabowo Subianto or Gibran Rakabuming Raka, President Joko Widodo’s eldest son and Prabowo Subianto’s vice presidential candidate. The president’s backing for Prabowo – Gibran was viewed as a safe space for voters since it appeared to guarantee the long-term viability of the development that President Joko Widodo had implemented throughout his administration.

CONCLUSION

The 2019 Indonesian elections underscored the profound impact of identity politics and Islamic populism on voter behavior, reflecting a complex interplay between political dynamics, religious movements, and societal perceptions. While president Joko Widodo adeptly navigated these challenges by aligning with moderate Islamic groups and countering militant tendencies, his opponent, Prabowo Subianto, embraced a pragmatic approach, engaging with reactionary Islamic factions.

This political landscape was further shaped by the inherent tensions and the rise of contemporary Islamic populism, which, rooted in religious ideology, posits a narrative of governmental neglect towards the Muslim majority. This sentiment fostered distrust in political institutions and exacerbated a social capital crisis, threatening the democratic fabric and the nation’s future stability.

During the 2024 elections, successful candidates skillfully merged Islamic values with a broader, pluralistic appeal and strategically aligned themselves with the incumbent president’s supportive network. This blend of religious appeal and political strategy not only determined their success but also indicates an evolving landscape of Indonesian politics.

Prabowo Subianto’s popularity, together with President Joko Widodo’s backing, swayed supporters to vote for this candidate duo. Prabowo Subianto – Gibran Rakabuming Raka was able to instill public trust in the

long-term viability of President Joko Widodo's agenda, which was critical in gaining community support. Prabowo Subianto – Gibran Rakabuming Raka's ability to communicate across generations demonstrates that the political themes and techniques he promotes have broad appeal in many areas of society and are demographically balanced. Finally, the attempt was made to win the election in one round.

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